I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we develop a solution method to obtain hierarchical noncooperative equilibria of the class of three-person three-criteria quadratic decision problems wherein the decision makers announce their strategies in a prescribed order. Specifically, let x denote the unknown state of nature. which is an n-dimensional second-order random vector whose statistics are known. Furthermore, let u, denote the decision (control) variable of decision maker (DM)i, which takes values in R', ( 
where the weighting matrices have appropriate dimensions and symmetry properties.
at the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Albuquerque. NM, December 10-12, To delineate the information structure of the decision problem, let 2, ( i = 1,2,3) be an mi-dimensional second-order random vector which is correlated with x , and with the joint probability distribution of (x, z,. zz,z3) known. Then, if 9, denotes the information available to DMi, we consider, in this paper. the following information structure: v l =~~l ,~2 , z 3 , u 2 ,~3~ 1 1 3 = { 4 .
? 2 = { z 2 , z 3 , u 3 ) 1.
(2) Each of these information sets ql is isomorphic to an appropriate dimensional Euclidean space, and we define an admissible strategy yl of DMi as a measurable mapping from t h i s Euclidean space into Rrl, with the further property that its realization is a second-order random vector. Let us denote the space of all such measurable mappings for DMi by r, which we call the "strateg)! space" of DMi.
For each triple of strategies (y, ET,; j E N ) , we denote the expected "cost functional" of DMi ( i E N ) . Consider now the following mood of play which incorporates three levels of hierarchy in decision making: first DM1 announces his strategy and enforces it on both DM2 and DM3.
Then, DM2 declares his strategy and enforces it on DM3 who, only thereafter, decides on his optimal (equilibrium) strategy by minimizing J 3 under the structural constraints imposed by the announced strategies of the other two DM'S, who are also cost minimizers. Our aim in this paper is to investigate the solution of this decision problem which incorporates three levels of hierarchy.
The two-person version of this decision problem (with DM3 being absent) was treated earlier in [I] , and was also recently discussed in [2] . One of the findings of [ I ] is that. under certain restrictions on the parameters of the problem, there exists a linear strategy for DMI, which, together with DM2's optimal response strategy, provides a global minimum for J,. In other words, the pair of equilibrium strategies of the DM'S in such a hierarchical decision problem constitutes an optimal solution to a particular team problem that has the same information structure as the original decision problem and has J , as the cost functional.
In this paper. we produce a counterpart of t h s solution (with an analogous feature) within the context of the three-person decision problem formulated above. In particular. we show that under certain condilions, there exists a triple of (equilibrium) strategies { y r . y;, y;) with the following property: by announcing y f . DM1 forces the other two DM'S to act in such a way so as to jointly ininimize J , . while y; forces DM3 to jointly minimize J2. subject to the restriction that DM1 has already announced y:. Such strategies are then clearly in hierarchical equilibrium, a precise definition of which is given in Section 11, along with a useful sufficiency result (Theorem I) from [3]. Explicit expressions for the equilibrium strategies are provided in Section 111. where it is also shown that they satisfy the conditions of Theorem 1. These strategies are linear in the dynamic part of the information. but are. in general, nonlinear in the static part. A specific scalar example included in the paper (Section rv) illustrates these results. The paper ends with a conclusion section and an Appendix. c It should be noted that this definition also accounts for possible nonunique responses of DM2 and DM3. which cannot be avoided, especially under the information pattern (2). Furthermore. it is noteworthy that it is. in general. impossible to construct the response sets R,( yI ) and R,( yI; y.) explicitly. and. therefore. any possibility for direct derivation of the hierarchical equilibrium strategy is ruled out. The folloning theorem. however. paves the way for an indirect approach towards the solution.
Preliminoy Worafion
For each y , ET,.define the subsetsSl(yl)cT2 minimizes Jl(yl, 62, [3) over r,. Then. y ; is a hierarchical equilibrium strategy for DMI, and, given any pair (7: . yj*)Ej,(y;). y; is a corresponding equilibrium strategy for DM2. and y; is an equilibrium strategy for DM3 corresponding to the pair (y; .
y: ).
In other words, any ( y ; . yT.y;) that satisfies 1). 2 ) and 3) above minimizes Jl(yl,y2,y?).
Iz(y;. yz. y3). and J 3 ( y ; . y ; . Y,) over (x. Y?. Y 3 ) E r I X r 2 Xr,.
DERIVATION OF A SET OF HIERARCHICAL EQUILIBRILW STRATEGIES
We now apply Theorem 1 to the specific decision problem formulated in Section I. Towards this end we first obtain the solution of the team problem under the assumption that g , ( x , u , . 11.. u,) is strictly convex in the l a s t three arguments, which is equivalent to the following assumption.
Assumption 1:
where
C 1 2 =~l z -~~~l l 
The solution presented in Lemma I above is the only one that could be obtained by utilization of dynamic programming; however, it is not the unique minimizing solution in r, Xr, XT,. To determine a complete characterization for the solution set. let us first introduce the information sets In particular, the unique element of the product set f , Xr2 X f 3 that corresponds (under such a relationship) to the strategies (9) is the triplet r;={m7)}.
Then. we have the folloxving. Lenln~u 2: Every solution of (7) is an element of the product space r; x r; xr; and, conversely. every triplet {y, ET,': i E N ) constitutes a solution to (7) . This property of the solution of (7) immediately leads to the following conclusion.
Proposirion 1: If y , is restricted to r(. then Sl(yl) introduced by (6a) becomes independent of y,. and is given by sl(yl)=r; xr;.
(17)
Any hierarchical equilibrium strategy for DMI. which also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1, ail1 have to be an element of r;. To obtain an explicit expression for y; we further restrict our investigation to a subclass of ri which comprises strategies that are linear in u 2 and u ; .
More specifically. we consider the class of strategies ~l ( ? l l ) = 7 ; ( i i l ) + B l ( i i z ) [ u2 -K ( i 2 ) ] + B 2 ( ? j 3 ) [ u3 -7 ; ( i j 3 ) ] (18) where ill(.) and B 2 ( . ) are matrix functions of appropriate dimensions whose elements are second-order random variables which are measurable with respect to the sigma fields generated by i j 2 and ?is, respectively. The reader should note that the strategy defined by (18) is indeed in ri for every such B , ( .) and B2( .). We now determine the conditions under ajhich there exists a strategy y;i(q,) of the class (18) so that S2(yI+)Cr; X r;. 
PreliminagJ notation for Lemma

(~, ) =~: ( i i , ) + b t ( i i z > [~2 -~~( i j 2 ) ] + B f ( i j 3 ) [~3 -~i . ; ( i i 3 ) ]
(21) we have ~~(~; ) = r ; x r ; .
Proof: Firstly, we note that, + c e ( B ; , B , * ) € Q , J2(y1*,yz,y3) is strictly convex and quadratic on i2 X r 3 . (This follows by substitution of (2) into J2( y,, y2, y 3 ) and by making Fse oE (19a) and (19b).) Therefore, the minimum of J2(y;, y2. y 3 ) over rz X r3, which is unique, can be obtained by person-by-person optimization and by simply taking the gradients of J2(y;, u 2 , u 3 ) with respect to u2 and u3 and setting these expressions equal to zero [4] . If this procedure is routinely carried out, then it follows that, under Condition 1, the minimizing solution of the said two-person team problem is (yi, 7;) which lies in r; XI?;. Now, if we instead consider the minimization problem minr,xr,Jl(Yf,y2, y3), its solution is clearly not unique, but (7;. 7:) is one such solution. Then, by recalling the construction of r; X r;, it readily follows that ( ( l z ,~3 )~r 2~r~:~Z ( Y~. . j 2 . 9 ? ) = rz min xr1 J~( Y I * . Y~,~~) ) = G~~; -Hence, qy:)=r;xr;.
0
The next step in the derivation non, is to determine a y ; ET; such that R 3 ( y ; ; y7)Cr;l. Towards this end, we again have to restrict our analysis to a subclass of strategies in r;, if we look for explicit conditions. Specifically, and by analogy with (18), we consider the class of strategies (22) where B 3 ( -) is a matrix function of appropriate dimensions ashose elements are second-order random variables that are measurable with respect to the sigma field generated by V3. An optimal choice for B3( .) is now provided in Lemma 4 below.
Preliminary notation for Lemma 4
For a given pair ( B , , B 2 ) E 0 , let 'k( B , , B 2 
we have R3(yl*; Yz*)=r;
and hence s2( y:) is nonempty.
Proofi For a given ( B t , B,*) E O that solves (20), the requirement that B, €*(BY, B j ) is equivalent to the strict convexity of J3(y;, y;, y 3 ) over r 3 . Therefore, J3(y;1, y j , y3)' admits a unique minimum which is in fact attained by y; under Condition 2 (see the Appeqdix). Then, clearly R 3 ( y ; ; y;)=r;=(y;}, which further implies that S2(y;) is nonempty
The following theorem now finally presents a solution for the threeperson hierarchical decision problem formulated in Section I.
Theorem I: Under Conditions 1 and 2, y: as defined by (21) provides a hierarchical equilibrium strategy for DM1 in the three-person hierarchical decision problem of Section I. y?, as defined by (22). is a corresponding equilibrium strategy for DM2, and y; given by (9c) is an equilibrium strategy for DM3 corresponding to Cy;, y?) .
Proof: Condition I ) of Theorem I is satisfied because of Lemma 4. Condition 2) is also satisfied, by Lemma 3 and Proposition I. Finally. condition 3) is fulfilled by Proposition 1. since 7; Er;. Consequently. Theorem 2 follows directly from Theorem 1. 0 Remark I: A striking feature of the solution presented in Theorem 2 is that the corresponding strategies are linear in the dynamic part of the information (which is u2 and u3 for DM1 and uj for DM2). but they are, in general, nonlinear in the static part of the information-this latter statement being true even if the underlying statistics are Gaussian. The following scalar example now serves to illustrate the results of the previous section. Let the objective functionals of the decision makers be given as and let x be a positive random variable, i t . , x>O with probability 1. We do not specify here the joint probability distribution of {x,zl.z2.z3}. since it mill not be explicitly needed in the solution of the problem (but only implicitly through the conditional expectations). Now g , is strictly convex in ( u I . u 2 . u,), and, therefore, Assumption 1 is satisfied. The team strategies (14) where the former is well defined since x is a positive random variable. The next step is to substitute (29) into (23) Furthermore. no restriction is imposed on the choice of 8,. Therefore, proceeding with the solution of (24). we obtain (uniquely) the deterministic value
It should be noted that, since this is a unique solution within the prescribed class of strategies. this problem clearly does not admit a linear equilibrium solution.
V. CONCLCSIONS
In this paper. we have considered a class of quadratic decision problems with three decision makers and three levels of hierarchy. and have shown within this context that the decision maker at the top of the hierarchy (DMI) still holds a powerful position as in the t\vo-DM case treated earlier [I] . By announcing an appropriate strategy. DM1 can force the other two DM'S to minimize jointly his own cost functional-this being so even if his strategy does not directly influence the cost functional of the DM at the bottom of the hierarchy (see the example in Section IV).
An important property of the hierarchical equilibrium strategy of DM1 is that it is. in general. a nonlinear function of his static information. even if the underlying statistics are Gaussian. This can best be observed by referring to equation (20a). and by noting that its solution B ; w-ill. in general, be a function of i 2 and i-,. and not a constant. (For a specific scalar example. this feature has already-been corroborated in Section IV).
Both the concept of hierarchical equilibrium and the solution method presented in Section I11 are easily extendable to N (>3) person decision problems with N levels of hierarchy. and with dynamic nested information that is compatible with this hierarchy in the decision process. A salient feature of the Stackelberg solution in such decision problems is that the equilibrium strategy of the DM at the top of the luerarchy (i.e.. DMI) forces the DM at the second level of hierarchy (Le., DM2) to force DM3 to force DM4.. . to force DMN to minimize collectively the cost functional of DMI. To obtain the corresponding Stackelberg strategies.
we first determine the equivalence classes (r;,F;;. .,rk.) of team strategies, so that any A'-tuple ~~~. T h e .~' -t u p l e o f s t r a t e g i e s ( y , *~T , . i = l : . -. .~ thus determined then constitute a Stackelberg equilibrium solution for the X-person decision problem with B levels of hierarchy.
It is also possible to extend the results of this paper to similarly structured multistage decision problems (wherein each DM acts more than once) under the one-step-delay sharing pattern. which will be the subject of a forthcoming paper. For the solution of the deterministic version of such a three-person multistage decision problem. the reader is referred to [3] . We also refer to [SI for a survey of the application of the Stackelberg solution concept to X-person multistage decision problems under a different class of information structures.
A~P E N D I X
In this Appendix we verify a missing step in the proof of Lemma 4. which is that the minimum of J, (y;, y;,.) 
